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NOTES
IMPROVING THE ADOPTION PROCESS: THE
PENNSYLVANIA ADOPTION ACT
The practice of adoption is of ancient origin,I and the history of its
growth and development is an interesting story of changing social and legal
concepts.2 In virtually every country in the world, adoption has existed as
a social institution in order to provide care for parentless and neglected
children and to perpetuate family titles and estatesO The practice of adop-
tion gradually achieved legal recognition and became the subject of legis-
lation in several ancient nations; 4 later the nations of continental Europe
inherited a system of adoption from the Roman civil law.5 However, legal
adoption, i.e., the transfer by law of parental rights and duties to someone
other than the natural parents, was unknown at English common law, and
the rights, liabilities and duties of parents were inalienable. 6 In fact, it was
1. The earliest record mentioning adoption is Art. 185 of the Code of Ham-
murabi, dating back beyond 2000 B.C. "If a man take in his name a young child as
a son, and rear him, one may n6t bring claim for that adopted son." THE CODE OF
HAmmtuRABI 69 (Harper ed. 1904).
2. See REIGHAmD, A Co1PARATIVE STUDY OF ADOPTION LAW IN FouR STATES
(1950) (Treatise on file in the research library of the Health and Welfare Council
of Philadelphia) ; Quarles, The Law of Adoption- A Legal Anmnaly, 32 MARQ. L.
REv. 237 (1949); MAINE, ANCIENlT LAW (10th ed. 1906).
3. See note 2 supra. See also, Bishop, Adoption in SocIAL WoaK YEAR BooK
25 (11th ed. 1951). The Hindu culture presents an example of a situation in
which there may arise the need for adoption in order to pass estates. "Among the
Hindoos, the right to inherit a dead man's property is exactly co-extensive with the
duty of performing his obsequies. If the rites are not properly performed or not
performed by the proper person, no relation is considered as established between the
deceased and anybody surviving him; the Law of Succession does not apply, and
nobody can inherit the property. Every great event in the life of a Hindoo seems
to be regarded as leading up to and bearing upon these solemnities. If he marries,
it is to have children who may celebrate them after his death; if he has no children,
he lives under the strongst obligation to adopt them from another family, 'with a
view,' writes the Hindoo doctor, 'to the funeral cake, the water and the solemn
sacrifice."' MAINE, ANCIENT LAW 204 (10th ed. 1906). Evidences of adoption
practice are found in the Bible: Moses was adopted by Pharaoh's daughter, Exodus
2:5-10; and Esther by Mordecai, Esther 2:5-7. Adoption was well practiced by the
Greeks, Egyptians and Babylonians, Lamb v. Feehan, 276 S.W. 71, 78 (Mo. Supp.
1925) ; In re Kirby's Estate, 145 Misc. 756, 758, 261 N.Y.S. 71, 72 (1932), and by
the ancient Germans, Matter of Thorne, 155 N.Y. 140, 143, 49 N.E. 661, 662 (1898).
4. "In Greece, in the interests of next of kin whose rights were affected by the
case of adoption, it was provided that the registration should be attended with certain
formalities, and that it should take place at a fixed time, the festival of Thargelia.
"In Rome the system was in vogue long before the time of Justinian . . . but
he reduced the system to a code. . . ." Morrison v. Sessions Estate, 70 Mich.
297, 306, 38 N.W. 249, 253 (1888). For a complete analysis of the Roman law of
adoption before and after Justinian's codification, see SANDARS, THE INSTITUTES OF
JUSTINIAN 40-47 (1905). See also note 1 supra.
5. See 1 ENcYc. Soc. Scr. 461 (1937) ; RmGHARD, op. cit. supra note 2, at 2.
6. See Humphrys v. Polak, [1901] 2 K.B. 385, 390 (C.A.) ; Poole v. Stokes,
110 L.T. 1020 (1914); Fleming v. Roburite Co., 10 B.W.C.C. 176 (C.A. 1917);
Brooks v. Blount, [1923] 1 K.B. 257. "In English law the child had no absolute
right to succeed to any part of the parent's property, but could be disinherited by
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not until the passage of the Adoption of Children Act in 1926 that a system
of legal adoption was introduced into Great Britain.7
In the United States, Texas and Louisiana inherited much of the
Spanish and French civil law and with it a system of legal adoption.8 The
vast majority of jurisdictions, however, inherited no system of legal adop-
tion since they followed the English common law. Initially, legal adoption
was sometimes accomplished by a special statute validating the particular
adoption.' Beginning with Massachusetts in 1851,10 the states gradually
passed general adoption legislation.1 Although the motivation for these
statutes is not clear, it has been suggested that the civil law as reflected in
Texas and Louisiana influenced their development.' 2  A number of these
early statutes provided merely for evidence of the child's transfer by ;requir-
ing a deed which was to be recorded in the same manner as a property
deed.18
will in favor of either relatives or strangers. It was possible, therefore, without
resort to adoption, for family titles to be continued and family estates kept together
when there was no direct male descendant. Provision for care of dependent child-
ren by means of adoption was probably delayed by the development of the relation
of master and apprentice. By means of this arrangement orphans and children of
indigent parents could be bound out, while the rights of the master and of the parent
under this relationship were defined by law." 1 ENcYc. Soc. Scr. 461 (1937). At
common law, however, it was possible for a relative or a stranger to put himself in
loco parentis towards a child, so as to place himself in a fiduciary position in his re-
lations with that child. Powys v. Mansfield, 3 My. & Cr. 359, 366 (1837).
7. 16 & 17 GEo. 5, c. 29 (1926). Cf. Ward v. Dorman Long & Co., [1933]
2 K.B. 658 (C.A.).
8. See State ex rel. Walton v. Yturria, 109 Tex. 220, 204 S.W. 315 (1918);
Vidal v. Commagire, 13 La. Ann. 516 (1858). See also REIGHARD, op. Cit. supra
note 2; 1 ENcY. BRiT. 178 (1953) ; 3 LA. LEGAL ARCHIVES, 124, 125 (1940) (CoDE
oF NAPOLEON, art. 343 (1804)).
9. See Sayles v. Christie, 187 Ill. 420, 58 N.E. 480 (1900); Bedal v. Johnson,
37 Idaho 359, 218 Pac. 641 (1923); Vidal v. Commag~re, 13 La. Ann. 516 (1858)
(Louisiana used private statutes after the repeal of the adoption law in 1808. A
new general statute was enacted in 1870). This last case grows out of the second
section of the Act of March 15, 1837, which is as follows:
"Be it enacted, &c.; 'That Pierre Jean Baptiste Vidal and Filiciti Blanwhe
Power, of the parish of Orleans, be authorized to adopt a young orphan child
named Adele, aged about seven years, who has been brought up by them; pro-
vided the adoption be executed by act signed before a Notary Public in said
parish of Orleans, within six months after the passage of this law.'"
Id. at 517. Private laws were also passed in Wisconsin. See Quarles, The Law
of Adoption--A Legal Anomaly, 32 MAQ. L. Rxv. 237, 241 (1949).
10. Mass. Laws 1851, p. 324.
11. See White v. Kwock Sue Lum, 291 Fed. 732 (9th Cir. 1923); Weinbach's
Appeal, 316 Pa. 333, 175 Atl. 500 (1934); Schwab Adoption Cases, 355 Pa. 534, 50
A.2d 504 (1947). See also 4 VERNiER, AmRicAN FAMILy LAws § 254 (1936). Com-
pare 1 ENCYC. Soc. Sci. 461 et seq. (1937).
12. See Morrison v. Sessions Estate, 70 Mich. 297, 306, 38 N.W. 249, 253
(1888) ; Hochaday v. Lynn, 200 Mo. 456, 98 S.W. 585 (1906) ; Woodward's Appeal,
81 Conn. 152, 70 At. 453 (1908) ; In re Petition of Ritchie, 155 Neb. 824, 53 N.W.2d
753 (1952). See also REIGHARD, op. cit. supra note 2, at 2.
13. This type of provision existed in Pennsylvania before 1925 under Pa. Laws
1872, No. 20, p. 31. See also ALA. CODE 1886, § 2367; Vt. Acts 1880, No. 137, § 5;
Iowa Laws 1858, c. 67, §§ 2-4; Tex. Gen. Laws 1849-50, c. 39, p. 36.
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The philosophy manifested by some of the early statutes, that adoption
merely involves the transfer of a particular species of chattel, has been slow
to disappear from the legal scene.1 4 Nevertheless, in recent years adop-
tion has come to be recognized as involving factors of vital importance to
the community. More than establishing a new legal relationship, adoption
initiates an emotional and psychological relationship which, if unsuccessful
or unwarranted, could cause serious injury, both personal and social.' 5
Because of this expanding concept of adoption, the objectives of adoption
statutes have been generally enlarged to include: protection of the child
against unnecessary separation from natural parents and adoption by per-
sons unfit to have the responsibility of rearing a child; protection of the
natural parents against their own hasty decisions to give up the child; and
protection of adopting parents against such risks as taking the responsibility
for children whose mental and physical capacities or heredity are unknown.16
However, the statutory provisions enacted initially to effectuate these
objectives were far from adequate. In many jurisdictions adoption place-
ment could be made by anyone.J7 The child could be placed in an adoptive
home before the consent of the natural parent to the proposed adoption was
legally ascertained,' 8 and suitability of the adoptive home was seldom estab-
lished."0 The need for further amendment was patent, particularly during
the last decade. Between 1944 and 1951 it is estimated that adoption peti-
tions throughout the country increased by 60% 2° As a result of the
14. In Pennsylvania it was not until the Act of April 4, 1925, Pa. Laws 1925,
No. 93, p. 127, that the transfer by deed statute of 1872 was repealed. Texas and
Iowa have repealed their statutes within the last thirty years. See REIGHARD, op.
cit. supra note 2, at 3.
15. Bishop, Adoption in SocI.TA WORK YEARnooK 25 (11th ed. 1951).
16. See statutes cited in notes 18, 19 infra. These three objectives are specifically
set forth in CHIDREN's BuRAaU PuB., No. 331 (Fed. Security Agency 1949). This
pamphlet also presents a comprehensive examination of desirable provisions to be
incorporated in an ideal adoption statute.
17. See, e.g., Lee v. Thomas, 297 Ky. 858, 181 S.W.2d 457 (1944) (child placed
by a doctor); Wyness v. Crowley, 292 Mass. 459, 198 N.E. 758 (1935) (by a
doctor) ; In re Estate of De Soe. 134 Neb. 371, 278 N.W. 852 (1938) (by hospital
superintendent) ; In re Candalaria's Estate, 41 N.M. 211, 67 P.2d 235 (1937) (by
natural parents themselves); Diana Adoption Case, 165 Pa. Super. 12, 67 A.2d 751
(1949) (by a doctor). See also Note, 59 YALE L.J. 715 n.2 (1950).
18. Under the prior Pennsylvania provision consent was not legally determined
until the time of the adoption hearing although some acquiesence must have been
given by natural parents previously. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 1, § 3 (Purdon 1952).
See also, e.g., IDAHO CoE ANN. tit. 3, c. 16, § 1506 (1948) ; N.M. LAws 1893, c. 32,
§ 7, repealed by N.M. Laws 1925, c. 5, §§ 1,4; NEW YORK DomEsTic RELATIONS
LAW § 112 (1, 5) ; S.D. CoDE § 14.0406 (Supp. 1952).
19. As of 1936 there was no provision for investigation of the adoptive home
in 24 states. See 4 VERNIER, AasanxcAIr FAMIy LAws 294 (1936). In the states
in which an investigatory provision did exist, frequently the investigation was dis-
cretionary with the court and sketchy in nature, and in almost every instance in-
vestigation was not made until the time of the adoption hearing. See, e.g., id. at 298
(Ala. statute), 312 (Mass.), 312 (Md.), 336 (Wyo.), 326 (Pa.), 326 (Ore.).
20. In 1951 the number of adoption petitions filed in the United States probably
reached 80,000. Among the factors accounting for the increase were the large
number of homes broken by death, divorce, and desertion during and following
World War II; the increase in the number of illegitimate children born since 1944;
and the growing antipathy toward long periods of institutionalization. CHILDREN'S
1954]
762 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 102
magnitude of the problem, since 1948 more than half of the states have
passed new adoption acts or amended existing ones. 1
The growth of legal adoption in Pennsylvania has been consistent with
the general development in the United State3. Prior to, 1855, the adoption
status could be created only by a special act of the legislature.22 In 1855 a
statute was enacted enabling a person to petition the court for a decree of
adoption. 28  Subsequently, adoption by deed was authorized,24 and some
persons whose petitions had been denied utilized this method of securing an
adoption.2 In 1925 the legislature repealed all acts relating to adoption
and passed a new statute.2 6  This statute, however, was subject to the
same general deficiencies outlined above.2 7 In keeping with the national
trend, and spurred by the considerable increase in adoptions in this state
between 1944 and 195 1,28 the legislature amended the adoption law exten-
sively by an act which became effective on January 1, 1954.29 The purpose
of this act is to protect the rights of the child, the natural parent, and the
adoptive parents.3 The act requires that under certain conditions persons
receiving children for adoption must file a report and submit to an in-
vestigation of the suitability of their home. Under this provision the child's
background is also investigated. 31 It is provided that the issues of consent
and abandonment may be determined prior to the time of the hearing on
BUREAU STATIsTicAL SER., No. 14 (Dep't Health, Educ. and Welfare 1951). This
pamphlet represents the latest statistical compilation regarding the adoption of chil-
dren. See communication from Edward E. Schwartz, Chief, Program Analysis
Branch, Department of Health, Education and Welfare, Washington, D. C., Febru-
ary 26, 1954, on file, Biddle Law Library, University of Pennsylvania Law School.
21. See, e.g., Del. Laws 1933, c. 162, 163, Del. Laws 1935, c. 212-16, as amended,
DEL RFv. CODz c. 13 §§ 901-28 (1953) ; Iowa Acts 1927, c. 218, §§ 1-8, as amended,
IowA CoDE ANN. c. 600, §§ 1-8 (1950), Minn. Laws 1917, c. 222, repealed and
superseded by MINN. STAT. ANN. c. 259, §§ 21-32 (West Supp. 1953); N.J. Laws
1902, c. 92, §§ 1-5, repealed and superseded by N.J. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, c. 3, §§ 1-36
(Supp. 1953); N.C. Pub. Laws 1941, c. 281, as amended, N.C. GEN. STAT. c. 48
(1949).
22. See Cox, Pennsylvania's Need-An Adequate Protective Adoption Program,
22 PA. BAR Ass'N Q. 154, 158 (1951).
23. Pa. Laws 1855, No. 456, p. 430.
24. Pa. Laws 1872, No. 20, p. 31.
25. See PA. DEV'T OF WELFARE, THE 1953 ADoPTioN AMENDMENT on file, Biddle
Law Library, University of Pennsylvania Law School.
26. Pa. Laws 1925, No. 93, p. 127; PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 1, § 1 et seq. (Purdon
1953).
27. See text at notes 17-9 m.pra. This statute did allow the court, at its
option, to have an investigation of the adoptive home made at the time of the hearing
on the adoption petition; this optional investigation is also available under the new
act.
28. Total adoptions in Pennsylvania from 1944-51, taken from statistics on file
with Children's Aid Society of Pennsylvania, 311 S. Juniper Street, Philadelphia,
Pa.: 1944-2962; 1946-3504; 1947--3639; 1948-4107; 1949--410; 1950-3860;
1951-4216.
29. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 1, § 1 et seq. (Purdon Supp. 1953).
30. See Jones, Pennsylvania's Adoption Law in Action, CURRENTS IN PENN-
SYLVANIA HEALTH AND WELFARE 9 (Pennsylvania Citizens Association, Spring 1954).
Mrs. Jones is Deputy Secretary of the Pennsylvania Department of Welfare. See also
text at note 16 mspra.
31. See text at notes 47, 48 infra.
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the adoption petition.82 The courts may grant decrees transferring custody
and the right to consent from natural parents to agencies approved by the
State Department of Welfare. This gives the parents an opportunity to
consult the agency's qualified staff before surrendering the child, and if
the child is surrendered to the agency, the parent does not appear again
in the adoption proceedings.8s Where under the act's definition of abandon-
ment the child has been abandoned for at least six months, the courts are
also authorized to grant custody of a child and the right to consent to his
adoption to an approved agency; 8 4 this makes it impossible to release for
adoption some formerly unadoptable children 8 5 Approved adoption
agencies are an important part of the new Pennsylvania adoption pro-
cedure and special provision has been made for approval of such agencies
by the State Department of Welfare. 6 The more important provisions
of the Pennsylvania act, as an example of recent adoption statutes, will bear
analysis to determine to what extent the current enactments further the
modern goals of adoption legislation.
THE PLACEMENT PROCESS
Adoption is a twofold procedure. The first phase is the placement
process by which a child is placed in the adoptive home. Generally he must
live in the prospective adoptive home for a considerable period of time, in
many states for a minimum of six months.8 7 After this period has elapsed,
the second or legal phase of adoption is instituted. First a petition for
adoption is filed, in Pennsylvania with the Orphans Court. Subsequently
there is a hearing on the petition at which the court determines whether
the proper consent has been given, or in lieu thereof whether there has
been abandonment or whether some other condition exists waiving the
need for consent, 8 and whether the adoption is in the best interests of the
child. These issues have been determined in the affirmative, a decree of
adoption is entered, final in some states and in others interlocutory for an
additional period.89
32. See text following note 85 infra.
33. Ibid.
34. See text at note 103 infra.
35. See Jones, supra note 30.
36. See text at note 145 infra.
37. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. c. 259, § 27 (West Supp. 1953) ; N.Y. Domissic
RELATIONs LAW § 112(7); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 1, § 4 (Purdon Supp. 1953) (prior
act) ; TEx. Crv. STAT. ANN. art. 46a, § 3 (Vernon 1953) (may request waiver of six
months period) ; Wyo. ComP. STAT. ANN. c. 58, §209 (1951). In some jurisdictions
the period before final decree of adoption is longer. See, e.g., 39 IowA CODE ANN. c.
600, § 2 (1953) (one year) ; N.C. GEN. STAT. c. 48, §§ 17-21 (1953) (one year) ; N.
DAx. REv. CoDE tit. 14, c. 11, § 1116 (Supp. 1953) (two years); 5 OHIo GEN. CoDE
ANN. §§ 8004.9-8004.11 (Page Supp. 1952) (one year) ; VA. CoDE tit. 63, § 356 (1952)
(one year).
38. Where the natural parent is of unsound mind, or is a habitual drunkard, con-
sent is not normally required. See MINN. STAT. ANN. c. 259, § 03 (West Supp.
1953); N.Y. Do0-EsTIc RELATIONS LAW §111(4); PA. STAT. ANN. tit 1, §2
(Purdon 1953) (prior law). For other situations where consent is not required, see
Note, 24 RocKY MT. L. REv. 357, 362 (1952).
39. See statutes in note 37 supra.
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There are generally two types of placement: agency and individual.
Problems are most likely to be created when the latter method is used; in
fact, individual placement, or the gray market, as it is called, is perhaps
the most serious problem in adoption.40 In the typical agency placement,
a detailed study is made by the agency of the child's background and its
health and mental capacities. In addition, the prospective home is care-
fully scrutinized in order to determine whether the prospective parents are
mentally, morally, economically and psychologically fit to assume the care
of the particular child. It is only after these studies have been made and
the results found to be favorable that the child is placed in the adoptive
home.41 Where a child is placed by individuals, however, and such has
been the case in 48% of non-relative adoptions, 42 there is frequently little
investigation made as to the suitability of the child or the adoptive home.
More often than not, a well meaning physician, minister or attorney takes
the child of an unwed mother and, with no more than a superficial examina-
tion of the suitability of the adoption, consigns it to the care of persons he
knows are desirous of adopting a child.43 At the subsequent hearing on the
adoption petition, the court, in an effort to determine whether the adoption
is in the best interests of the child, may order an investigation which might
show the child or the adoptive home to be unsuitable in some particular.
44
Then the court is faced with a dilemma. Although the child or home is
unsuitable in some respect, the child by virtue of his having been in the
adoptive home for a considerable period of time has formed emotional at-
tachments to the adoptive parents and conversely they to him. Psy-
chologists recognize that uprooting the child under such circumstances
might have serious emotional repercussions. 4 5 The realization of this
40. See Note, 59 YALE L.J. 715 et seq. (1951) and authorities cited therein.
Conversely, the black market problem of dealing commercially in children is no
longer considered to be of major significance. See BowLRY, MATERNAL CARE AND
MENT. HEALTH, WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION: MONOGRAPH SERIES 107
(1952). This option is also expressed by the Yale Law Journal after conducting
a survey of various states. See Note, 59 YALE L.J. 715 n.2 (1950).
41. Information received from conversation with Mr. Walter P. Townsend,
General Secretary of the Children's Aid Society of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia
Bureau. A more detailed presentation of the agency procedure can be found in
Note, 59 YALE L.J. 715 (1950). See also Clothier, Placing the Child for Adoption,
26 MENTAL HYGIENE 257 (1942)
42. CHI.DREN'S BUREAu STATISTICAL SER., op. cit. supra note 20, at 5. These
are the latest available figures. See note 20 supra.
43. The incidence of unsuitability in independent placement as opposed to agency
placement is illustrated by a study conducted in 1945 by Dr. Catherine S. Amatruda
of the Yale Child Development Clinic, the results of which are cited in the Yale
Law Journal. "Her standards were modest. A child was regarded as a good
adoption risk unless it was mentally retarded or had serious personality defects.
A family was regarded as suitable unless the investigation disclosed a highly un-
stable marriage, serious psychiatric difficulties, alcoholism, prostitution, wife beating,
or drug addiction. Of the hundred independent placements, only 46 were satisfactory;
26 were questionable at best; and 28 were definitely undesirable. The hundred
agency placements, on the other hand, had brought about a satisfactory situation
in 76 instances; a questionable situation in 16; and an undesirable situation in only
8." Note, 59 YALE L.J. 715, 124 n.43 (1950).
44. See note 19 supra.
45. See BowLBY, op. cit. upra note 40; Colby, Protection of Children in Adop-
tion, 65 PROCEEDINGS OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF SOCIAL WORK 146, 154
(1939).
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exerts a pressure on judges to approve the adoption despite the unsuitability
of the adoptive home.
46
In an effort to solve this problem, the Pennsylvania legislature has
enacted Section 1(c) of the new act. This section provides that every
person receiving possession or control of a child for the purpose or with
the intention of adoption has the duty to make a report to the court of the
county wherein such person resides within thirty days of receiving pos-
session or control of the child; this report must name the intermediary
from whom the child was received.4 7  Thereupon the court is required to
cause a complete investigation to be made as to the suitability of the
placement, by an appropriate person.4 8 Natural parents, grandparents,
step-parents, brothers or sisters of the whole or half blood and uncles or
aunts by blood or marriage are specifically excluded from the requirement
of making a report. Where the child has been received from an agency,
the court may accept a report from that agency in lieu of an investigation.
The provision does not outlaw independent placements, since there are
not enough qualified agencies available to give the necessary service. Any
such prohibition will therefore not be workable until existing agency serv-
ices are strengthened and new ones developed.4 9 The Pennsylvania provi-
sion does, however, attempt to remedy the danger inherent in an inde-
pendent placement, by providing for an examination of the suitability of the
home and the child for each other before any deep attachment has been
formed.
Section 1(c) represents one of several legislative approaches to the
independent placement problem. Statutes in some jurisdictions provide
that no person except a natural parent, a guardian, a relative or an author-
ized agency may place a child for adoption.50 However, the effectiveness
of this type of provision is reduced by the fact that a third party can in-
fluence a natural parent to place the child for adoption. Moreover, even
46. In 1938 it was stated that only 16% of adoption petitions where the adoptive
home was found to be unsuitable were dimissed or denied. Colby, supra note 45,
at 156. For judicial discussion of the emotional disturbance factor see, e.g., Pool v.
Gott, 14 L. Rep. 269 (Mass. 1851); Commonwealth ex rel. Children's Aid Society
v. Gard, 362 Pa. 85, 90, 66 A.2d 300, 303 (1949); Davies Adoption Case, 353 Pa.
579, 588, 46 A.2d 252, 257 (1946). In the Davies case the court said, "The emo-
tional disturbance to a child that would threaten from its being removed summarily
and permanently from familiar and agreeable surroundings and associations, incident
to the only parental control and supervision it has ever known, could have a very
harmful effect on the child's whole life. Fortunately, the law's regard for a child's
welfare does not admit of any such injury or harm being done it." Id. at 588, 46
A.2d at 257.
47. The report shall also contain the circumstances surrounding such person's
receiving or retaining possession of the child plus name, age, date and place of
birth, and religious affiliations of the child and persons making the report.
48. "Such investigation shall include pertinent information with regard to the
health antecedents and eligibility for adoption of the child, the health, social and
eonomic status of the adopting parents and any other information regarding the suita-
bility of the placement" PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 1, § 1 (c) (Purdon Supp. 1953).
49. Letter dated April 6, 1954 from Mr. Walter P. Townsend, General Secre-
tary, Children's Aid Society of Pennsylvania, Philadephia Bureau, on file, Biddle
Law Library, University of Pennsylvania Law School.
50. See, e.g., Wis. STAT. c. 48, § 37(1) (1951) ; D.C. CODE tit. 32, § 705 (1951);
N.Y. SOCIAL WELFARE LAW § 374.
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without influence of third persons, direct placement by natural parents,
guardians or relatives is no guarantee of the suitability of the adoption.51
Several states require that no placement may be made without a court
order or the consent of the welfare department, 52 but in these statutes there
are no provisions for investigation; in addition, experience with one such
statute has shown widespread violation.5 3 The Pennsylvania provision
falls into a third category, i.e., statutes requiring that persons receiving or
placing children in adoptive homes must file a report, and thereafter submit
to an investigation.54 As long as some independent placements must be
permitted, this last class of provisions, properly administered, is perhaps
the best solution to the problem of independent placements. 5 However,
the specific provisions of the Pennsylvania section contain several weak-
nesses.
One difficulty with the Pennsylvania provision lies in the fact that it
provides no sanction for failure to file a report. Vhile it has been sug-
gested that a failure to file might preclude an adoption decree from being
granted, 6 it is doubtful that this result would occur frequently. The fact
that no report has been filed and consequently no investigation made will
normally become known only at the time of the hearing on the adoption
petition, which will be at least six months after placement. If investigation
at that time shows the adoptive home to be suitable, there would be little
reason to deny the decree. If, on the other hand, the home is found to be
unsuitable, the court will be faced with the same dilemma which existed
before the new provision was enacted: whether to risk severe emotional
disturbance to the child by uprooting him 17 or to allow him to remain in
an unsuitable home. There is nothing to indicate that the courts will be
more inclined than previously to decide to remove the child.
51. Examples of the operation of this procedure are given in an opinion by the
attorney general of Wisconsin cited in Note, 59 YALE L.J. 715, 732 n.91 (1950).
"'The physician who confined Miss A, an un-married mother, learned that she had
expressed a wish to place her child for adoption. He therefore informed Mr. and
Mrs. Y, who were patients of his, that he knew of a child that would be available
for adoption. He gave the name of the adoptive parents to the mother. They made
arrangements to transfer the child to them upon discharge from the hospital. The
adoptive parents sent a relative to meet the mother outside the hospital and the
relative transported the child alone to the prospective adoptive home."' The at-
torney general also expressed a reluctance to prosecute the doctor in such a situa-
tion. "'.. . [I]t is our opinion that on the narrow fact situation presented no
successful prosecution could be maintained.'"
52. See, e.g., Mo. Rmv. STAT. ANN. § 453.110 (Vernon Supp. 1953) (court order);
Neb. Laws 1949, c. 204, § 1 (court order) ; OHio GEN. CODE ANN. § 1352-13 (1946)
(consent of the welfare department or court order, for children under two years).
53. MuLLENix, OHIO ADoPTION STUDY 28-30, 38-9, 42, 178 (mimeo 1941).
54. See also, e.g., MD. ANN. CODE GEN. LAWS art. 88 A, § 16A (Flack Supp.
1947) (receivers must notify welfare department); MASS. ANN. LAWS, c. 119 § 14
(Supp. 1948) (placers and receivers); N.H. Rlv. LAWS c. 130, § 17-8 (1942) (re-
ceivers); RI. GEN. LAWS ANN. c. 373, § 3 (1938) (placers). However, unlike
Pennsylvania, in Massachusetts, Maryland and New Hampshire the investigation
is discretionary with the department.
55. See text at note 49 supra.
56. See Busser, The Adoption Act of 1953, 25 PA. BAR Ass'N Q. 197 (1954).
57. See note 46 supra.
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An adequate sanction is essential if the report and investigation pro-
vision is to be effective. Perhaps the most effective sanction would be a
positive pronouncement in the act that a failure to file would result in the
child's being removed from the adoptive home. Yet, such a provision would
lead to the removal of some children from suitable homes-an undesirable
result no matter what the reason for the failure to file. An alternative
sanction would be a heavy fine for failure to file.58 Although a wealthy
adoptive parent may not be affected by this sanction, to the majority of
adoptive parents the fine would be a strong incentive to file.5 9 More im-
portant, the threat of a fine would tend to deter placements with prospective
parents who suspected that they did not meet the stautory requirements
and were therefore anxious to avoid investigation. Adding the knowledge
that a heavy fine must be paid to the risk of losing the child on the ground
of unsuitability, which risk is never completely absent, would operate to
reduce the likelihood of such persons' accepting a child.
Aside from the question of sanction there is another major difficulty
with section 1 (c) as presently framed. The section requires that only per-
sons who have possession or control of a child "for the purpose or with the
intention of adopting such child . . . need file a report." 6 Many per-
sons who eventually adopt children receive them initially for what they
believe to be only a temporary period, with no intention to adopt.61 If the
child lives for a long period of time with the family and forms strong at-
tachments before a report is filed, the investigation process may come
too late to be effective. The danger involved in requiring that only per-
sons who have an intent to adopt need file a report might be reduced
in several ways. Under the provision as framed, a burden of proving
no intent at time of receipt should be placed on the parents petitioning
for adoption. Alternatively, the intent to adopt language might be deleted
and the provision made to require that "whoever receives and whoever
places an infant . - . for adoption or for giving it a home or for pro-
curing a home or adoption for it" 62 must file a report. Even so broad a
provision would not require filing for a considerable period of time after
receipt of a child in instances where there is no intent to give the child
a home. Extending the filing provision to placements intended to be tem-
porary, however, would give such broad coverage as to create problems
58. Cf. N.H. REv. LAWS c. 130, § 15 (1942) (provides for $100 fine or one year
imprisonment). See also Ky. REv. STAT. C. 199, § 350 (1953) (person bringing
child into state to place for adoption must file $10,000 bond conditioned, inter alia,
on filing a report with Welfare Department).
59. Of 281 applications for adoption filed with the Children's Aid Society of
Pennsylvania, very few represented persons with incomes over $8000; 133 applicants
had incomes between $3000 and $5000. Information received from Children's Aid
Society of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia Bureau, 311 Juniper St., Philadelphia.
60. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 1, § 1 (C) (Purdon Supp. 1953).
61. This factor was pointed out by Hon. Edward Leroy van Roden, President
Judge of the Orphans Court in Delaware County, Pa.
62. 4 MAss. ANN. LAws c. 119, § 14 (1949). Under this statute apparently
even relatives must report receipt of a child; but compare 4 MAss. ANN. LAWS c. 119,
§ 6 (1949). See discussion of relative adoptions at note 64 infra.
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of enforcement and administrative feasibility. Welfare departments today
cannot, and probably would not want to, check up on every child visiting
friends for any substantial length of time.6 Obviously, any filing require-
ment depends for effectiveness on enforceability and availability of sufficient
investigatory facilities to take advantage of the filed reports.
In addition to the foregoing there are other deficiencies which to a
greater or lesser extent reduce the effectiveness of the Pennsylvania provi-
sion for a report and investigation on receipt of the child. Several classes
of relatives are excluded from the filing requirement. It has been sug-
gested that these groups might also be unsuitable to rear the child and
should submit to investigation before the child has been placed in their
home.64 At least two arguments serve to justify the exclusion of some rela-
tives. First, a great number of relative-adoptions are by a step-parent and
his or her individual unsuitabiility would make little difference, since the
child would normally be living with that parent in any event.5 Further-
more, insofar as the statutory provision is meant to protect an adoptive
parent from forming an attachment for a child who later proves to be in
some way retarded or afflicted, the exclusion is justified since relatives are
more likely to be aware of the child's background. While these arguments
carry some weight they do not overcome the harm which can occur from an
unsuitable placement with relatives, which might be avoided by timely
investigation. It has been suggested that the exclusion was enacted as a
result of strong "social policy" against interference in intra-family relations
in this area.66 It would appear, however, that the influence of any such
policy is diminishing, in view of the several areas in which intra-family rela-
tions have become subject to state regulation.67 Moreover, even assuming
strong community opposition to interference with family adoptions, a tactful
63. New Hampshire, however, has such a requirement. N.H. REv. LAws c.
130, § 12 (1942) provides: "Whoever receives [a child] under his care or control
• . . for a period of more than 30 days shall within two days [after receiving it) give
notice thereof and of the terms upon which such infant was received, to the commis-
sioners of public welfare. . . ." Relatives are excluded from this provision but,
as written, schools, camps, and other institutions would appear to be covered.
64. See CHILDREN'S BUREAU PUB., op. cit. supra note 16, at 17. Some judges
have expressed to the writer an intention to require an investigation of members
of the excluded class at the time of the adoption hearing, under the authority of
Section 3 of the new Act which provides that at the time of the adoption hearing
the court "shall also make or cause to be made an investigation . . . to verify the
statements of the petition and such other facts as will give the court full knowledge
as to the desirability of the proposed adoption."
65. 39%7 of all adoptions for which a family relationship was reported were by
step-parents. See CHILDREN'S BUREAU STATISTICAL SmE. No. 14, p. 4, table 3 (Dep't
Health, Educ. and Welfare 1951).
66. Opinion expressed by Mr. Ralph C. Busser, Jr., Chairman, Committee on
Family Law, Pennsylvania Bar Association; also by Mr. Walter P. Townsend,
General Secretary, Children's Aid Society of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia Bureau.
67. See, e.g., UNIFORM RECIPROCAL ENFORCEMENT OF SUPPORT ACT, 9(A) ULA
57 (Supp. 1953), PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 62, §§2043.1-2043.27 (Purdon Supp. 1953)
(provides method of getting support from father or husband outside jurisdiction
without suing in foreign jurisdiction or bringing respondent into petitioner's juris-
diction) ; Juvenile Court Law, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, §243 et seq. (Purdon 1953)
(neglected children can be removed from parental home).
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approach by investigators, and the indulgence of an almost inescapable
presumption that because of the nature of the family tie a relative home is
suitable, should help to overcome any antagonism.
There are two other deficiencies in the Pennsylvania filing provision
which warrant consideration. First, the section makes no provision for the
child if the adoptive home is found to be unsuitable. 68 While judges might
have the child turned over to an institution, it is possible that without a
legislative recommendation to this effect courts may be inclined to find the
home suitable rather than to institutionalize the child.6 9 In the second
place, an inexperienced investigator might be appointed. The provision
for investigation states that the investigation be made by a child care agency
(with its consent if it is a private agency) or by the State Welfare Depart-
ment. However, in lieu of either of these alternatives, the court may ap-
point any appropriate person to make the investigation."° There is a danger
that such an appointee might lack the necessary qualifications. To be effec-
tive, the examination requires more than a mere finding of the child's and
adoptive parents' good health and a determination that the latter are capable
of supporting the child. The motivation underlying the desire to adopt a
child is vital, and elements such as the emotional stability of the adoptive
parents are not to be underestimated. 71 The court should exercise great
care in appointing investigators, and it is unfortunate that the legislature
has not created at least minimum criteria to govern the choice.72 With or
without minimum criteria, however, finding sufficient qualified inves-
tigators will be a problem. Individual investigators must continue to be
used, since currently existing public and private agencies are already hard-
pressed to make adequate investigations before the child is settled in the
adoptive home.73 In placement investigation, as in all phases of adoption,
real advancement depends upon public recognition of the problem and sup-
port of adequate public facilities.74
68. Under the Massachusetts statute the Department of Public Welfare may take
the infant into custody if the protection of the infant so requires. 4 MAss. ANN.
LAws c. 119, § 14 (1953). In New Hampshire the court can make orders for the
custody, care or protection of the child. N.H. Rav. LAws c. 130, § 14 (1942).
69. Especially is this true in viev of the growing emphasis on avoiding lengthy
placement in institutions and boarding homes. CHiLDR N's BuREAu STATISTIcAL
Sm., op. cit. mpra note 20, at 1.
70. ". . . the court shall cause a complete investigation to be made by one
of the following agents, a local public child care agency, a private child care agency
(with its consent), the State Department of Welfare, an appropriate person desig-
nated by the court. . . ." PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 1, § 1(c) (Purdon Supp. 1953).
71. See CHILDREN'S BuREAu PuB., op. cit. supra note 64, at 17; Note, 59 YALE
L.J. 715, 720 (1951) ; BowLBY, op. cit. supra note 40, at 104-5.
72. Other jurisdictions allowing the court to appoint investigators also fail to
establish minimum criteria. See ILL. ANN. STAT. c. 4, §3-1 (Smith-Hurd Supp.
1949) ("suitable person"); S.D. CoDE § 14.0406 (1953) ("discreet and competent
person"). See also Note, 59 YALE L.J. 715, 730 n.80 (1950).
73. In Rhode Island, a state having a provision similar to Pennsylvania's in-
vestigation requirement, as of 1949 the case-load was reported as 200 investigations
per worker. See Note, 59 YALE L.J. 715, 734 n.101 (1950).
74. See text at note 163 and note 163 infra.
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THE LEGAL PHASE
A. Voluntary Relinquishment
The problem of consummating an adoption satisfactory for the child,
natural parents and adoptive parents is complicated by difficulties arising
not only out of the placement procedure, but from the legal phase of adop-
tion as well. Practically every state requires, absent certain situations
which are deemed tantamount to consent,75 that the consent of the natural
parent or parents to adoption be obtained before an adoption decree is en-
tered. 76 In the majority of jurisdictions the consent issue does not arise
until the time of the hearing on the adoption petition,77 which fact can give
rise to serious problems. It is agreed that it is best for all parties if the
natural parent does not know the identity of the adoptive parents,
78 yet
this identity is revealed through the appearance, for consent purposes, of
the natural parents at the hearing. There is an even more important
difficulty with many consent practices. Children, especially illegitimate
children,7 9 are often placed for adoption after a hasty decision on the part
of the natural parent, motivated by family pressure or real or imagined
fear of social stigma.80 Furthermore, consent may be obtained through
fraud."' At the subsequent hearing on the adoption petition or on appeal,
the natural parent may contest the adoption on the ground that no proper
consent was given, and the adoption decree may be denied or vacated.
82
Denial of the decree does not automatically determine custody, however;
this is a further determination which must be made after the denial of the
75. See note 38 supra.
76. A complete listing of consent provisions is found in Note, 24 RocY MT.
L. REv. 359, 360 n.18 (1952). Apparently South Carolina has no provision requir-
ing consent of the natural parent or patents. See S.C. CoDe § 10-2581 et Seq.
(1953).
77. But cf. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, §§ 1101-9 (1953); Wis. STAT. C. 48,
§ 07(7) (a) (Y) (c) (1951) (these statutes provide for termination of parental rights
prior to the time of the adoption hearing).
78. BowLBY, op. cit. supra note 40, at 106. Cf. CniLDRExs BuREAu Ptm., op.
cit. mtpra note 16, at 8 (recommending that there should be a prior termination of
parental rights to prevent the natural parents from gaining knowledge of the identity
of the adoptive parents).
79. Half of the children for whom adoption petitions are filed were born out
of wedlock. CHILDREN'S BuREAu STATISTICAL SEP., op. cit. supra note 20, at 7.
80. See, e.g., Susko Adoption Case, 363 Pa. 78, 69 A.2d 132 (1949); Deama
Adoption Case, 165 Pa. Super. 12, 67 A.2d 751 (1929) ; Combs v. Edmiston, 216 Ark.
270, 225 S.W.2d 26 (1949).
81. See, e.g., Falck v. Chadwick, 190 Md. 461, 59 A.2d 187 (1948) (parent
thought adoption was merely prcvisional) ; Lambert v. Taylor, 150 Fla. 680, 8 So.2d
393 (1942) (mother signed consent thinking it was merely to give child name);
Arnold v. Howell, 98 Cal. App.2d 202, 219 P.2d 854 (1950) (parent thought adop-
tion was only temporary).
82. See, e.g., Susko Adoption Case, 363 Pa. 78, 69 A.2d 132 (1949); Lambert
v. Taylor, 150 Fla. 680, 8 So.2d 393 (1942); Skaggs v. Gannon, 293 Ky. 795, 170
S.W.2d 12 (1943) ; Combs v. Edmiston, 216 Ark. 270, 225 S.W.2d 26 (1949).
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petition, on the basis of the child's best interestsp3  If custody is awarded
to the natural parent, the child and adoptive parents are injured by the
abrupt dissolution of an attachment which may have been welded over a
considerable period of time.84 Conversely, if the court awards custody to
the adoptive parents, the natural parent may be made to suffer unduly for
a hasty decision to relinquish the child.s 5
The Pennsylvania legislature has attempted to alleviate this problem
by a provision for voluntary relinquishment. Section 1.1 of the new act
provides that when a person under eighteen years of age has been in the
care of an approved agency for at least thirty days, the parent or parents
may petition the court for permission to relinquish forever all parental
rights, and the agency shall join in such petition. After a hearing in which
the court decides the truth of the averments, a decree is issued directing
transfer of custody to the agency and authorizing such agency to consent to
a subsequent adoption without further consent of or notification to the
parents. This provision" goes a long way toward resolving the difficulties
under the prior law. In many cases where placement has been by an
agency,88 the court will be able to determine consent judicially before the
child is placed in an adoptive home; therefore it can effectively prevent
placement under an improper consent and subsequently, when determining
whether the adoption is in the best interest of the child,8 7 it will not be
faced with the choice between a defrauded or coerced natural parent and
a devoted foster parent.8 8 In addition, since the natural parent may con-
sent before the child is placed for adoption and need not later be informed
of the adoption hearing, the adoptive parents need no longer fear subse-
quent contacts with the natural parent. Since under the voluntary relin-
quishment provision custody of the child and authority to consent to a sub-
sequent adoption is awarded to the agency, there is the additional benefit
that the agency can perform its task of placing the child with more assurance
83. See Oelberman Adoption Case, 167 Pa. Super. 407, 74 A2d 790 (1950);
Petition of Sulewski, 113 Pa. Super. 301, 173 Atl. 747 (1934). Cf. Urrutia v.
Urrutia, 142 S.W.2d 267 (Tex. 1940) ; Strode v. Silverman, 209 S.W.2d 415 (Tex.
1948). In re Adoption of Mary Alice Miller, 98 Pitt. Legal J. 105 (Pa. 1950);
Lambert v. Taylor, 150 Fla. 680, 8 So.2d 393 (1942).
84. In the Lambert case, note 83 supra, child was in foster home for seven years
before removal.
85. In the Miller case, note 83 supra, the court awarded custody to the adoptive
parents temporarily. In determinations like this, both parties would suffer: the
natural parent until she can recover the child, the adoptive parents since they may
have to relinquish the child, and the child since he still may be uprooted.
86. This procedure may not be available where there is an independent place-
ment. See text at note 90 infra.
87. See text following note 110 infra.
88. In Wisconsin and Delaware, states having a similar provision for prior
termination of parental rights (see note 77 supra), there has been no record of
adoption petitions contested on the ground of improper consent. See communication
to this effect from Mr. Fred DelliQuadri, Director, Wisconsin State Welfare Dep't,
Division for Children and Youth, Jan. 19, 1954, and Mrs. Jerry T. Ross, Supervisor
of Adoptions, Delaware Dep't of Welfare, Jan. 11, 1954, on file, Biddle Law Library,
University of Pennsylvania Law School.
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of permanency to prospective parents. This furthers the whole adoption
process.8
9
However, there is one major difficulty which the section does not re-
solve. No provision is made for termination of parental rights prior to
the adoption hearing where a child has been placed by the natural parent
or an individual intermediary9 In these situations the adoptive parents
are still subject to harassment by the natural parent and decrees may still
be contested for improper consent. Furthermore, the typical consent con-
test in the past has arisen where an individual intermediary or an inde-
pendent placement was involved. 91 The argument has been made that
since prior termination also involves an award of custody to the interme-
diary, and since individual intermediaries are not in a position to care for
the child properly prior to placement, termination should be allowed only
where an agency is involved.92 However, the natural parent should be
able to relinquish his rights to a child whether or not the child is presently
in the control of an adoption agency. Where an independent placement is
involved, the court after termination of parental rights could award cus-
tody of the child to the Department of Welfare or an approved agency as
it sees fit.
93
The voluntary relinquishment provision is also deficient in failing
to provide a time limit on appeals from a decision terminating right to
custody. Limitation of the right to appeal is important since as long as
an appeal is possible, it is better not to place the child. The general Penn-
sylvania appeal provision, applicable here, enables appeals to be taken
within three months after the entry of the order.94 A shorter limit, like
the Wisconsin provision of forty days, 95 would be preferable. With such a
limit the child would probably not be placed before an appeal is taken, or at
89. Opinion expressed by Mr. Walter P. Townsend, General Secretary, Children's
Aid Society of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia Bureau.
90. Section 1.1 provides for termination of parental rights where "any person
. . .has been in the care of an approved agency. . . ." (italics added). PA. DEP'VT
o, WELFARE, THE 1953 ADo-rlON AMENDMENT 9 (1953).
91. See cases cited in notes 80-83 supra. Unlike Pennsylvania, the Missouri and
Delaware provisions do not require that the child be placed with an approved agency
before termination of parental rights is allowed. See provisions cited in note 77
.rupra.
92. Opinions expressed by Hon. Edward Leroy van Roden, President Judge of
the Orphans Court of Delaware County, Pa.; Mr. Walter P. Townsend, General
Secretary, Children's Aid Society of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia Bureau, Ralph C.
Busser, Jr., Chairman, Committee on Family Law, Pennsylvania Bar Association.
93. The Delaware voluntary termination provision provides that whenever the
natural parents desire to relinquish custody or parental rights,
. . .The Orphans' Court having jurisdiction of the proceedings may
terminate all existing rights of the parent or parents, person or agency then
having such rights with reference to such child, and may grant such rights to
such person or authorized agency or the Department of Public Welfare as may
seek them, or to such person or authorized agency or the Department of Public
Welfare as may, in the opinion of the court, be best qualified to have them."
DEL. CODE ANN. c. 13, § 1103 (1953).
94. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1136 (Purdon 1953).
95. Wis. STAT. § 48.07(8) (1953).
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least placed only for a short time. Under the Pennsylvania law a court
hearing an appeal might still be faced with the dilemma of uprooting the
child or working a hardship on the natural parent.
B. Abandonment
Another issue in the legal phase of the adoption procedure which can
work severe hardship on the parties involved is the problem of abandon-
ment. Under many statutes, where abandonment is found the consent
of the natural parent to adoption is not required.9 Like the consent issue,
however, the question of abandonment is frequently not resolved until the
time of the hearing on the adoption petition. 7 Problems similar to those
raised by the consent requirement may therefore result. A child appar-
ently neglected by its natural parent or parents might reside in a foster
home for a considerable period of time, but at the time of the adoption
hearing or even subsequently it might be determined that no abandon-
ment had occurred and the decree denied or vacated.9 8  A finding of no
abandonment is especially likely under the stringent requirements of many
abandonment doctrines which demand a settled intent to forego the
parental. relationship,99 and in some cases demand the element of wilful-
ness.100 Where the court at the adoption hearing finds no abandonment,
it may still be confronted with the necessity of deciding the issue of cus-
tody between devoted foster parents to whom the child is strongly at-
tached and a natural parent who has not legally abandoned his child and
whose absence may have been justified.101 Even if the foster parents re-
ceive custody, "legal title" and claims to the child's filial obligation remain
96. See, e.g., MD. REv. STAT. art. 16, § 85(G) (1947); PA. STAT. ANN. tit.
1, § 2(C) (Purdon 1953); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 908 (1951). See generally,
4 VmimR. Ai-anIcAN FAmIlY LAws 340 (1936).
97. See, e.g., Weinbach's Appeal, 316 Pa. 333, 175 At. 500 (1934); Smith v.
Crivello, 338 Ill. App. 503, 88 N.E.2d 107 (1949); It re Anonymous, 195 Misc. 6
88 N.Y.S.2d 829 (Surr. Ct. 1949).
98. See, e.g., Schwab Adoption Case, 355 Pa. 534, 50 A.2d 504 (1947) (mother
visited child three times in year and half, no abandonment); Adoption of Nora
Espenshade, 55 Dauph. County 399 (Pa. 1945) (father gave gifts, visited from time
to time, child "at adopting parents" home for 11 years, no abandonment) ; Crawford
v. Arends, 351 Mo. 1100, 176 S.W.2d 1 (1943) (defect in decree 17 years later for
purposes of inheritance); People ex rel. Cocuzza v. Cobb, 196" Misc. 961, 94
N.Y.S2d 616 (Sup. Ct. 1950) (child in adoptive home for 6 years, no abandon-
ment).
99. See tests used in Oelberman Adoption Case, 167 Pa. Super. 407, 74 A.2d
790 (1950); McGill's Adoption, 49 Pa. D. & C. 374 (1944); Winans v. Luppie, 47
N.J. Eq. 302, 20 AtI. 969 (Ct. Err. & App. 1890).
100. It re Gates' Adoption, 84 Ohio App. 269, 85 N.E.2d 597 (1948) (although
found failure to provide home, food, clothing, absence of allegation of wilful conduct
allowed parents to prevent adoption). Cf. Adoption of Joseph David Taxter, 51
Montg. County 18 (Pa. 1933).
101. See, e.g., Susko Adoption Case, 363 Pa. 78, 69 A.2d 132 (1949) (mother's
failure to keep illegitimate child with her was occasioned by family pressure);
Molin Adoption Case, 34 Del. County 470 (Pa. 1946) (mother ill and father in the
service); Ashton Adoption Case, 374 Pa. 185, 97 A.2d 368 (1953) (mother never
saw child, information of its whereabouts kept from her).
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with the natural parent. 102 While the adoptive parents may have assumed
all financial and other parental responsibilities, the natural parents may
continue to show just enough interest in the child to preclude adoption.
Section 1.2 of the new Pennsylvania statute attempts to meet these
difficulties by providing that when a person under the age of eighteen years
has been in the care of an approved agency for a minimum of thirty days
and it appears that such person has been abandoned for at least six months,
the agency may petition the court for a hearing to find abandonment and
award custody to the agency. Five days' notice by registered mail is given
to the alleged abandoning parents. Subsequently, the hearing takes place
and, after a finding of abandonment, custody is awarded to the agency along
with the authority to consent to a subsequent adoption. 03 Providing in
this fashion for a determination of the issue of abandonment before the
child is placed for adoption removes, to some extent, the dangers involved
in the prior practice. Adoptive parents need no longer worry about the
denial of their petition on this, ground, and judges will not have to face
the necessity of choosing between a worthy adoptive parent and a natural
parent whose neglect has been justified. 10 4  However, just as with the
voluntary relinquishment provision, prior judicial determination of aban-
donment can occur in Pennsylvania only where the child is in the care of
an approved agency. In the great many cases where no agency is involved,10 5
the disadvantages of delayed determination of abandonment remain. It
should be provided that persons receiving children from independent place-
ments might, when it appears that there has been abandonment, file a peti-
tion for a determination as to abandonment. The determination could be
made, as it is in the case of agency placements, without waiting for the
hearing on the adoption petition, and, if abandonment is found, an award
of custody could be made to the new parents, with the right to consent to
a subsequent adoption given to the Welfare Department. While it is im-
possible in the case of an independent placement to provide for an abandon-
ment determination before the placement has been made, it is desirable to
settle the issue as early as possible, so that the prospective adoptive parents
will know whether or not the child will be adoptable and can adjust their
relationship to the child accordingly.
The abandonment question involves not only the question of securing
an early determination of the abandonment issue, but also the danger of
making children unadoptable as a result of too stringent definition of aban-
donment. The Pennsylvania act incorporates the definition of abandon-
102. Custody is only one of the parent's rights. Deprivation of this right
does not necessarily terminate natural parents' survivorship rights, rights to earn-
ings, or child's duty to support parents. For a complete analysis of reciprocal
rights and duties between parent and child, see 4 VmRNIER, AMRICAN FA.snMy LAwS
4 et seq. (1936).
103. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 1, § 1.2 (Purdon Supp. 1953).
104. See cases cited note 101 supra.
105. See text at note 42 supra.
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ment commonly applied under prior practice, "conduct on the part of a
parent which evidences a settled purpose of relinquishing parental claim
to the child and of refusing or failing to perform parental duties." 106 Under
this doctrine an agency will have no better chance of securing a decree
of abandonment than adoptive parents had previously.10 7 A definition
of abandonment more favorable to the adoptive process would be acqui-
esence ". . . in a termination of that close relationship which normally
exists between parent and child, and in the assumption by others of com-
plete parental rights and responsibilities . .. " 108 The difficulty in
evolving a fair definition of abandonment lies in the need to balance the
interests of the natural parent, who may have been forced to neglect the
child because of temporary financial or emotional circumstances, against
the desirability of getting the child settled as soon as feasible in an adop-
tive home. 10 9 It would seem that for society to fulfill its primary respon-
sibility to the child, it should be recognized that the natural parents' rights
are conditioned by concomitant duties; neglect of these duties should at
least place upon the delinquent parents the burden of proving that con-
tinuation of his ties with the child is desirable.110
C. The Best Interest Doctrine.
Perhaps the most important requirement of the entire adoption process
is the court's determination of whether the adoption will further the child's
best interest.'' The new Pennsylvania statute expressly provides that,
over and above the other requirements of the act, the court must be satis-
fied "that the welfare of the person proposed to be adopted will be pro-
moted by such adoption .... " 112 Therefore, a natural parent may still
contest the adoption on this ground even though all the other require-
ments are met." 8  The issue then becomes whether the child's interests
are better served in the adoptive home or in the home of the natural
parent."14
In determining where the best interests of the child lie, whether for
the purpose of examining an attack upon a proposed adoption or for
106. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 1, § 1 (Purdon Supp. 1953). Compare cases cited notes
99, 100 supra. See text following note 107 supra.
107. Ibid.
108. Rutz Adoption Case, 50 Lack. J. 25, 27 (Pa. 1948); cf. McGill's Adoption
Case, 49 Pa. D. & C. 374, 380 (1944).
109. Even without a determination of abandonment, custody can be awarded to
someone other than the natural parents. See text at note 83 supra. On the value
of early adoption, see BowLBY, op. cit. supra note 40, at 101-2.
110. See Note, 60 YArx L.J. 1240, 1246 (1951).
111. See, e.g., Diana Adoption Case, 165 Pa. Super. 12 (1949); Oelberman
Adoption Case, 167 Pa. Super. 407, 74 A.2d 790 (1950); Falck v. Chadwick, 190
Md. 466, 59 A2d 187 (1948); see Susko Adoption Case, 363 Pa. 78, 81, 69 A.2d
132, 134 (1949).
112. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 1, § 4 (Purdon Supp. 1953).
113. See Harvey Adoption Case, 375 Pa. 1, 99 A.2d 276 (1953). Compare
Ashton Adoption Case, 374 Pa. 185, 97 A.2d 358 (1953).
114. Ibid.
.1954]
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determining custody generally, many factors have been considered: the
relative economic and environmental advantages which will accrue to the
child in the two homes; 115 the similarity of religious affiliation; 116 the
degree of kinship between the child and the contesting parties; 117 the num-
ber of children which the contesting parties may already have; 118 the men-
tal and physical health of the contesting parties; 119 the care which the child
will receive if returned to the natural parents; 120 the emotional stability
of either set of parents; 121 and other factors. 22  Where there is an obvious
deficiency in either set of parents, which occurs frequently with the natural,
unwed mother,'-2 the decision before the court is not too difficult. How-
ever, where the relative merits of the two homes are more nearly balanced,
courts must weigh a variety of factors, such as those listed above, often
relying on their own instincts as to the validity of the factors which
they use.'24
Except where the case is clear for one side, courts are inclined to favor
the natural parents on the basis of a belief that the natural parent is in-
herently a better parent. 2 5 The validity of this assumption has been ques-
tioned by scientific studies, 2 6 and consideration of the typical situation in
the natural home also casts doubt upon this assumption. Half of the
115. See Harvey Adoption Case, 375 Pa. 1, 10, 99 A.2d 276, 280 (1953) (relative
size of homes, nature of domestic lives in two homes).
116. Commonwealth ex rel. Kuntz v. Stackhouse, Civil No. 229, Del. County,
Pa., March 11, 1954. See Purinton v. Jamrock, 195 Mass. 187, 199-200, 80 N.E.
802, 804-5 (1907); Oelberman Adoption Case, 167 Pa. Super. 407, 415, 74 A.2d
790, 794 (1950).
117. Commonwealth ex reL. Edinger v. Edinger, 374 Pa. 586, 98 A.2d 172 (1953)
(mother chosen over father and grandparents); Commonwealth ex rel. Kuntz v.
Stackhouse, supra note 116.
118. See Commonwealth ex rel. Kuntz v. Stackhouse, supra note 116.
119. See Commonwealth ex rel. Edinger v. Edinger, 374 Pa. 586, 591, 98 A.2d
172, 174-5 (1953).
120. Weinbach's Appeal, 316 Pa. 333, 338, 175 Atl. 500, 502 (1934) (mother,
if she got child, would put it in foundling home).
121. Oelberman Adoption Case, 167 Pa.- Super. 407, 74 A.2d 790 (1950) (natural
mother showed an unstable nature by her actions in continuing to have dates with
various men while pregnant and after illegitimate child born).
122. See Notes, 59 Y= L.J. 715 (1950); 60 YALE L.J. 1240 (1951); 61 YALE
L.J. 591 (1952).
123. Cf. Oelberman Adoption Case, supra note 121; Weinbach's Appeal, supra
note 120; In re Adoption of Mary Alice Miller, 98 PiTr. LEGAL J. 105 (1950)
(mother does not intend to admit maternity).
124. A judge's ability to make appropriate determinations in this area is limited
by the inadequacies in his own training and the investigatory facilities available to
him. See Note, 61 YALE L.J. 591, 597 (1952).
125. In Harvey Adoption Case, 375 Pa. 1, 10, 99 A.2d 276, 280 (1953), the
court implicitly assumes that the natural home is a good one and that the adoptive
home must rise above this presumption. In Ashton Adoption Case, 374 Pa. 185, 200,
97 A.2d 368, 376 (1953), the court says "[tihe natural mother has a presumptive
right to the care and custody of her child." See also Commonwealth ex rel. Edinger
v. Edinger, 374 Pa. 586, 594, 98 A.2d 172, 176 (1953), in which the court, in award-
ing the children to their natural mother, rather than to the father and grandparents,
said that a mother is a child's ". . . most loving companion, his best teacher, his
most devoted defender, and his greatest inspiration. .... "
126. Cited in Note, 61 YALE LJ. 591, 595 n.21 (1952) ; cf. Bower, op. cit. supra
note 40 at 101 et seq.
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children considered for adoption are illegitimate,'2 7 and frequently the
natural parent contesting the adoption is the unwed mother. It has been
suggested that the unmarried mother is often neurotic, psychopathic, or
mentally defective, and uses the child as a weapon against herself and
her parents.128 At best she is subject to social and emotional pressures
not conducive to supplying a stable home life. Even where the child is
not illegitimate, the mere fact that the child was placed for adoption sug-
gests that adverse emotional or financial factors exist in the natural home,
whereas the whole adoption process aims at selectivity in adoptive parents.
Another factor which is considered in determining the child's best
interests is the similarity of its religion to either set of contesting parents.129
In fact, the new Pennsylvania act specifically provides that whenever pos-
sible the adoptive parents shall be of the same religious faith as the natural
parents,'3 0 which means that similarity of religion is singled out as a factor
to be considered in the placement process, as well as in later controversies
over custody. Similar provisions are present in numerous state adoption
laws.' 8 ' It may be argued that these provisions in no way promote the
child's interest and are an unnecessary roadblock in the process of placing
a child in an otherwise suitable home. This argument is supported by
the tendency of some courts operating under these provisions to consider
the religious factor as paramount, the best interest of the child notwith-
standing.'3 2 On the other hand, the provision apparently will make little
change in Pennsylvania practice. In the past, while religion has been con-
sidered an important factor, normally it has not in itself been considered
determinative; 18 where adopting parents of the same religion are unavail-
able, but there is available a home suitable except for a difference in
religion, the difference has rarely prevented placement.' 3 4 An attempt to
evaluate the soundness of the emphasis on similar religions is complicated
by the differing points of view of the various religions. It is the position
of some religions that theirs is the most desirable for purposes of salva-
127. CHInmDRN's BuREAu STATISTICAL SEP., op. cit. supra note 20, at 7.
128. BoWLBY, op. cit. supra note 40, at 94.
129. Cases cited note 116 supra.
130. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 1, § 1(d) (Purdon Supp. 1953).
131. See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. c. 4, §4-2 (Smith Hurd Supp. 1953); N.Y.
SocIAL WELFARE LAW § 373; R.I. GEN. LAws c. 1772, § 26 (1946).
132. See Note, 54 CoL. L. REv. 376 (1954).
133. Oelberman Adoption Case, 167 Pa. Super. 407, 415, 74 A.2d 790, 794
(1950) (child allowed to remain with foster parents despite difference in religion) ;
Royer Adoption, 34 Del. County 402 (Pa. 1946) (although same religious faith is
desirable, such fact alone will not prevent adoption by persons of another faith if
such adoption will promote child's best interest); cf. St. George's Adoption, 45 Pa.
D. & C. 387 (Erie County 1942) ; Purinton v. Jamrock, 195 Mass. 187, 199-200, 80
N.E. 802, 804-5 (1907). But cf. In re Margaret Riley, 20 Pa. Dist. 745 (Phila.
County 1911) (child placed in a Protestant institution, removed to Catholic or-
phanage solely because his parents had been Catholic). In several cases, although the
custodians of the child were of a different religion, they were enjoined to raise the
child in the religion of its parents. Commonwealth cx rel. Lyter v. Witmer, 53
Dauph. County 377 (Pa. 1943); Commonweatlh ex rel. Chimienti v. Chimienti, 32
Del. County 241, 246 (Pa. 1943).
134. See cases cited note 133 supra.
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tion, and that denying the child the benefits of their religion does in fact
work to his moral detriment.13 5 In addition, in the case of the child who
is old enough to be aware of the practices of the religion of his parents,
a change might affect him psychologically. 13 6  Aside from the question of
the benefit to any particular child provided by use of the religion criterion,
disregard by the courts of religious similarities might evoke a community
reaction which would have an unhealthy effect upon the adoption system
generally; rejection of the agency method of placement in favor of private
placements might be increased.
37
In view of the importance attributed to the "best interests of the
child" doctrine, it is apparent that the methods of ascertaining the best
interests could be improved. Some of the criteria which are considered,
such as superiority of the natural mother's love, are of doubtful validity.
Some factors should perhaps be given more weight than they are presently
accorded. For example, it has been urged that the motives of the adopting
parents for making the adoption should be taken into consideration, 188
although this is not generally done. Most important, some courts are
prone to underestimate the danger to the child in being uprooted from an
adoptive home.13 9 Judges should be provided with specific standards for
determining what in fact constitutes the best interest of the child. The
legislature has provided in some measure the means for obtaining these
standards by enabling the judge in his discretion to rely on psychological
reports supplied by agencies. 14 However, judicial practice displays a cer-
tain reluctance to rely very heavily on these reports. In some measure this
reluctance arises from the paucity of scientific studies on adoption and the
lack of unanimity among psychologists as to precisely what standards should
govern in any particular instance.' 41 Therefore, an attempt to develop
uniform standards is extremely desirable to guide the courts toward more
135. This position is especially true of the Roman Catholic Church. Informa-
tion received from The Catholic Charities, Archdiocese of Philadelphia, 1702 Summer
Street, Philadelphia, Pa.
136. See Purinton v. Jamrock, 195 Mass. 187, 199-200, 80 N.E. 802, 804-5 (1907).
137. Opinion expressed by Mr. Walter P. Townsend, General Secretary, Child-
ren's Aid Society of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia Bureau.
138. BowLBY, op. cit. supra note 40, at 104-5.
139. In Harvey Adoption Case, the court said: "Nor can it be said that a child of
such tender years . . . may have formed such affectionate ties in its present home
that it would be difficult for it to adjust itself to a new environment; an infant of
that age easily forms new attachments." 375 Pa. 1, 10, 99 A.2d 276, 280 (1953). But
compare BowLBY, op. cit. supra note 40, at 112: "An exceedingly common mistake has
been the assumption that removing a child from his home will lead him to forget it
and to start afresh ... " Cf. Commonwealth ex reL. Buckner v. Barr, 101 A.2d
621 (Pa. 1954).
140. "The said court or judge shall also hear any other testimony . . . neces-
sary to inform the court as to the desirability of the proposed adoption, and shall
also make or cause to be made an investigation by some person or public agency
or private agency (with its consent) . . . to verify the statements of the petition
and such other facts as will give the court full knowledge as to the desirability
of the proposed adoption." PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 1, § 3 (Purdon Supp. 1953). In the
New York City Domestic Relations Court problems involving children are re-
ferred to a psychiatric board for evaluation and suggestion. Note, 61 YALE L.J.
591, 597 (1952).
141. See generally BowLBY, op. cit. supra note 40.
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effective exercise of their discretion. Without such standards, the best
interest doctrine misapplied may prevent the result desirable in any adop-
tion procedure--a proper child in a proper home.
THE APPROVED A-DOPTION AGENCY
It is apparent that the emphasis throughout the provisions of the new
Pennsylvania adoption act is on increased agency participation in the adop-
tion process. Agencies are one of the groups selected to make investiga-
tions of adoptive homes; 142 they are given custody of the child in the
provisions governing termination of parental rights,14 and their staff mem-
bers may advise the court as to the best interest of the child.14 Since their
place in the process of a successful adoption is so important, the legislature
has included in the new act a separate provision for the approval of such
agencies. 145 Under this section the state Welware Department is charged
with promulgating standards which an agency must meet in order to
achieve or maintain an approved status. While agencies of insufficient
caliber to meet the standards of the department are still able to place chil-
dren for adoption,146 they do not have the benefit of receiving custody
of a child after a judicial termination of parental rights; 14
7 thus the in-
centive for approval will be strong.148
The Welfare Department has published a set of minimum criteria for
approved agencies 149 and has granted approval to an initial group of
agencies. 150 The character of the investigation which agencies are required
by the minimum standards to make compares favorably with criteria used
in other jurisdictions. 151 They include the general required findings con-
cerning matters of health, age, education and economic status,
52 but, in
142. See text at note 70 supra.
143. See text following notes 85, 102 supra.
144. See text at note 140 supra.
145. PA. STAT. ANN. fit. 1, § 1(b) (Purdon Supp. 1953).
146. See PA. DEP'T OF WELFAPE, THE 1953 ADoPTIoN AMENDMENT (1953).
147. Sections 1.1 and 12 specifically refer to "approved" agencies. PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 1, §§ 1.1, 1.2 (Purdon Supp. 1953). See also PA. DEP'T OF WELFARE,
op. cit. supra note 146.
148. At the time of the legislative discussions on the new act there was con-
siderable argument as to whether or not agencies should be required to secure a
license in order to operate. However, strong interests opposed such a move and
the resultant compromise was enacted. Information received from conversation
with Mr. Walter P. Townsend, General Secretary, Children's Aid Society of Penn-
sylvania, Philadelphia Bureau.
149. PA. DEP'T OF WELFARE, MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR AGENCIES (1954).
150. Thirty-nine agencies were approved as of March 31, 1954; list received
from Pennsylvania Department of Welfare on file, Biddle Law Library, University
of Pennsylvania Law School.
151. See ILL. DEPT OF PUBLIC WELFARE, MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR CHILD
PLACING AGENCIES (1953); MICH. DEP'T OF SOCIAL WELFARE, CHILD CARING
INSTITUTIONS AND CHILD PLACING AGENCIES (1953); ALA. BoARD OF PUBLIC WEL-
FARE, MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR CHILD-PLACING INSTITUTIONS (1952); N.H. DEP'T
or PUBLIC WELFARE, RULES 'FOR LICENSING PRIVATE CHILD-PLACING AGENCIES
(1950) (copies on file, Biddle Law Library, University of Pennsylvania Law
School).
152. PA. DEP' OF WELFARE, o. cit. supra note 149, at 5-7.
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addition, the investigation must include a study of the mental health and
emotional stability of the individuals involved.15 Aside from the initial
study, the agency is required to keep the child and the adoptive home under
surveillance throughout the six-month pre-adoption period, and three
personal visits to the adoptive home are required; the child may be re-
moved if the visits show an unsatisfactory development.154 Despite the
comprehensive nature of the investigations, the qualifications which ap-
proved agencies are expected to require of their staffs appear inordinately
low.15 5 Only one member of the staff need have social work training. 5
6
Apparently caseworkers need have no minimum qualifications. Under
such standards, it is difficult to see how the comprehensive investigation
can be made properly. The investigators may have little or no knowledge
of what factors should be uncovered, how they can best be uncovered, and
what conclusions should be drawn from them.
157
On the whole, Pennsylvania's minimum standards are unduly sketchy.
Items such as caseload per caseworker and interoffice staff development
have not been considered; s58 no mention is made of facilities required for
the care of a child until an adoptive home is found. 59 Plant facilities of
the agency itself are not considered, nor are the reports to the Department
of Welfare required.160 Annual renewal of the approval of each agency
153. Ibid. The importance of such factors is discussed in BOWLBY, op. cit. supra
note 40, at 104-5. Compare Note, 59 YALE L.J. 715 (1950).
154. PA. DE'T OF WELFARE, op. cit. supra note 149, at 7-8.
155. PA. DineT OF WELFARE, op. cit. supra note 149, at 4. Compare the higher
standards required by MICH. DEP'T OF SOCIAL WELFARE, CHILD CARING INSTITUTION
'AND CH.D PLACING AGENCIES 5 (1953); AiA. BOARD OF PULIC WELFARE,
MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR CHILD-PLACING INSTITUTIONS 67 (1952); N.H. DEP'T
OF PUBLIC WELFARE, RULES FOR LICENSING PRIVATE CHILD-PLACING AGENCIES 8
(1950); MONT. DEP'T OF PUBLIC WELFARE, MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR LICENSING
OF CHILD ADOPTION AGENCIES 6-7 (1952) (copies on file, Biddle Law Library, Uni-
versity of Pennsylvania Law School).
156. PA. DE'T OF WELFARE, op. cit. supra note 149, at 4.
157. The Children's Aid Society in Philadelphia requires that its caseworkers
have a Master's degree in social work. While such a requirement as a general
standard might be too high, it indicates the minimal nature of the requirement of the
Pennsylvania Department of Welfare.
158. Compare, e.g., Nebraska and Wisconsin requirements for child placing
agencies, which prefer a case load of 25 to 30 cases per worker. NEB. DEe'T OF
ASSISTANCE & CHILD WELFARE, MINIMUM STANDARDS AND GOALS 20 (1951);
Wis. DEE'v OF PUBLIC WELFARE, STANDARDS FOR CHILD WELFARE AGENCIES 54
(1948). See also Alabama reqirements for child placing agencies which provide an
extensive formal training program for workers within the agency. ALA. BOARD OF
PUBLIC WELFARE, MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR CHILD-PLACING AGENCIES 68-9 (1952)
(copies on' file, Biddle Law Library, University of Pennsylvania Law School).
159. Maryland and Alabama requirements provide that agencies maintain a re-
source of foster homes to be used should the needs of the child so require. MD.
DEP'T OF PUBLIC WELFARE, LICENSE FOR CARE OF CHILDREN 7 (1953); ALA. BOARD
OF PUBLIC WELFARE, MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR CHILD-PLACING AGENCIES 81 (1952)
(copies on file, Biddle Law Library, University of Pennsylvania Law School).
160. Compare, e.g., ILL. DEP'T OF PUBLIC WELFARE, MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR
CHILD-PLACING AGENCIES 3 (1953); MICH. DEP'T OF SOCIAL WELFARE, CHILD-
PLACING AGENCIES 28 (1953); ALA. BOARD OF PUBLIC WELFARE, MINIMUM STAND-
ARDS FOR CHILD-PLACING AGENCIES 85 (1952); TEx. DEP'T OF PUBLIC WELFARE,
MINIMUM STANDARDS, CHILD-P-ACING AGENCIES 11 (1951) (copies on file, Biddle
Law Library, University of Pennsylvania Law School).
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is, happily, provided for; 161- reports from the agencies might facilitate the
renewal process,
CONCLUSION
An examination of some of the problems which arise in the area of
adoption and of one modern legislative approach to their solution reveals
the important part played by the adoption agency today and our dependence
for a solution of the problems on the cooperation of adequate, qualified
agencies. Because public welfare departments today are equipped to fill
only a supervisory capacity in the adoption process, the public must con-
tinue to rely on the work of private agencies. But it is important that
this work meet high standards, defined and enforced by the state, if the
adoption process is to be effective; an adoption must be a skilled process
if it is to result in a statisfied natural parent, a proper home for the child,
and adoptive parents well adjusted to their new responsibilities.1 32
Independent placements are inferior to the agency process in many
respects: where an individual placement is made, no trained personnel
is available for counseling natural parents, for assessing the potentialities
of the child, or for predicting the suitability of the prospective home. Agency
placement offers the best opportunity for the operation of a voluntary re-
linquishment procedure, and for the collection of statistics pertinent to the
development of a more scientific adoption program. Clearly, ultimate
elimination of independent placements should be the goal. While this
can be only a long range aim, more immediate progress can perhaps be
made by continuing the advancements initiated in recent statutes, by im-
proving, for example, the abandonment doctrine and the procedure for
reports by recipients of children. In particular, an attempt should be
made to evolve more rational criteria for determining a child's best interest
and to assist courts in implementing these criteria. Experience with the
Pennsylvania act may show that it needs strengthening along some of the
lines which have been suggested, but it nevertheless represents a substantial
step forward. Further advances in any of the proposed directions can come
only with an increasing public awareness of the problems and financial
support for the expansion of public and private facilities. 1 0 The signifi-
cance to the community of providing its children with adequate opportunity
to develop into well-adjusted adults, 64 if brought to public attention, should
assure interest in improving the adoption process.
161. See Section l(b).
162. See BowLBY, op. cit. supra note 40, at 101.
163. In Los Angeles a citizet's committee on adoption problems has been func-
tioning for sometime. FEmRAL SEculnv AosExcy, CnrlLu'i's BUtEAu, THE CiTi-
zmgs AaoPrnox CommrrraE op Los AxGELaS COUNTY (1952). In Pennsylvania
it has been stated that the failure of the community in Allegheny County to support the
Community fund drives in 1949 and 1950 indicate that pubilc agencies which de-
pend on that source will have to retrench their activties. The private agencies in
this area are also having difficulties. In 1947 two maternity homes ceased placing
children. Cox, Pennsylvana's Need-An Adequate Adoption Placement Program
22 PA. B.A.Q. 154, 160 (1951).
164. On the relationship between unsatisfactory parental relationships in child-
hood and crime, see BowLin, op cit. supra note 40, at 30 et seq.
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